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ABSTR4CT
The provision of public consumption goods and public abatement are analysed within a second-
best framework of optimal taxation with environmental euernalities. Households choose between
consumption of produced goods and leisure. Po(lutioo is a by-produU of production and can be of(-set by
pubGc abatement. If private goods are perfect substitutes for pubGc goods and environmeotal quality,
greener preferences reduce employment, raise abatement and improve environmental quali[y. One
version of the 'double dividend- hypothesis, i.e. greener preferences both enhance the environment and
boost employment, thus fails. If the elasticity of substitution between private goods and leisure exceeds
one, the [ax rate increases, [hereby reducing private wnsumption. However, if [he labour supply curve
bends backwards, private utility rises while the tax rate and pubGc wnstunption fall. With imperfect
substitution betwecn private and pubGc consumption, greener poGcies boost labour supply in the special
wse that the substitutioo elasticity between private and public wnsumption and the elasticity of the
e((ectiveness of public abatement are small and the labour supply curve bends backwards.
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~ This paper has benefited from comments of Harry Huiz~nga artd participants in the 1993 AUTE~RES
Conference at the Universíty of York.Protecting the environment constitutes one of the major challenges facing poli[icians today. In
the poGtical debate, it is often (orgot[en that important trade-ofTs have to be (aced and that environ-
mental poGcy is part of the overall package of government poGcy instruments. Many poGticiaas argue, for
example, that Ihe revenues from taxes on polluting aUivities should be used [o reduce distortíonary taxes
elsewhere in the economy. This may yield a"double divideod' in the sense that both env'vonmental
quality and employment will rise (cL Pearce, 1991). Environmtntal policy raises also important other
issues. Under what conditions is a cJeaner endvonmeol compa[ible with a higher rather than a Iower
Ievel of pubGc consumption? Dces a cleaner endvonment require a fall in private utility? How dces
environmental policy affect the tax level and the level and composition of pubGc spending? The objective
of this paper is to provide answers to some of these major poGcy questions.
Taxes serve the dual purpose of, on the one hand, generating revenues to fmance a sizeable
public sector and, on the other hand, internalizing endvonmental externalities. Atkinson and Stern (1974)
analyze the optimal provision of pubGc goods, paying attentioo to deadweight losses of taxatioo and the
marginal cos[ of public funds, but ignore endvonmental eicternalities. Sandmo (1975) considers the
optimal determination of distortionary taxes in the presence o( eiGernalities in private consumption but
assumes an exogenous public revenue target. Sandmós analysis thus combines Ramsey and Pigovian
objectives of pubGc finance. Bovenberg and van der Plceg (1992) extend Sandmo's results to the optimal
provision of pubGc goods while allowing for a rich min of pohcy insUUments, viz. public coasumption of
both dirty and clean goods, public abatement, a taz on private consumption of dirty goods and a labour
tax. Their main result is that the 'double dividend' hypothesis fails, i.e. greener preferences lead in
general to a cut in Ihe labour tax, a rise in the dirt tax, and a fall in employmenL Bovenberg and van der
Plceg (1942) focus on external effects in consumption. This paper, in contrast, explores the effects of
endvonmental production externalities. Morevover, we allow for imperfect substitution between private
and public components of social welfare. Furthermore, we not only uudy the impact o[ changes in social
preferences but also the consequences of changes in the emissionroutput ratio and productivi[y shocks.
Section 1 characterizes the second-best outcome for a competitive economy in which households
obtain utility from consumption of private goods, leisure, public consumption and emironmental quaGty.
Section II assumes perfect subs[itution between private utility, public consumption and environmental
quality and performs comparative staticc with respect to changes in eovironmental or public concern, the
emission-output ratio and labour productivity. Section III allows for imperfect substitution between
private utility and public consumption. Section IV concludes the paper.
1. TAXATION, PUBLIC GOODS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES
LI. Private behaviour, market equilibrium and the govemment budget
The representative household receives income from employment (bL where b denotes the
production wage and L stands for óours worked). After paying taxes (tbL where t denotes the tax rate),
the household spends the after-tax labour income together with any (lump-sum) transfers received from
the government (S) on consumption goods (C). The budget cottstraint of the representative household
[hus amounts to (1-t)bLtS-C. The household derives private utility (M) from the consumption of goodsz
(C) and leisure (V -1-L, where the total oumber of hours available to [he household is normalized at
uni[y). The óousehold also obtains ulílity Gom pubGc goods (G) and eodvonmental quality. Pollution
occurs as a by-product of productioo. Hence, envvonmental quality declines with production (Y). It r~, n
óowever, be enhanced through public abatement (A). For example, the government may step in to clean
up polluted soil arising from dumping of óazardous materials in the past. If utility is separable in private
utility, public goods and environmental quality (i.e. E~rse(A)-aY), we have:
U- M(C,V) t R(G) t E[e(A) - aYj, R' ~0, R"50, E' ~0, e' ~0, e"~0 (1)
where a denotes the emission-output ratio and e(.) represents the effectiveness of pubGc abatement. The
private utility function M(.) is concave and weakly homothetic so Engel curves are linear. Households are
atomistic, so take wages, prices, the tax rate, public goods and endvonmental quality as given. House-
holds equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption goods and leisure to the after-tax
wage (w), i.e. My~M~-(1-[)b':w where subsaipts denote partial derivatives. Using the household
budget constraint, we obtain:
c- efws[, v- 1- r[ws~, M- m[w,s). (2)
where m[.J denotes the indirec[ private utility function. Roy's identity gives labour supply, i.e. L-m~,~a
where a~mS-M~ denotes the margmal private u[ility of private income. The (uncompensated) elas[icity
of labour supply (evaluated at S-0) is given by e~awla~L-(oN-1)V where aN s[ands for the elasticity
of substitution between C and V in M(.). Clearly, the (uncompensated) labour supply curve slopes
upwards (bends backwards) if the substitution effect dominates (is outweighed by) the income effect, i.e.
if oN exceeds (is less than) unity.
Labour market equdibrium implies that all unemployment is voluntary, i.e. Lt V- 1. Equilibrium
on [he goods market requires that total demand for goods, consis[ing of priva[e consump[ion (NC where
N deno[es [he number of households), public consump[ion (G) and public abarement (A), is constrained
by total output (Y):
Y-bNL- NC t G tA. (3)
We assume that output is proportional to employment and producer prices are fixed (without loss of
generality at unity). Relaxing this assumption dces not affect the results, so long as producer prices result
from competitive behaviour and pure profits arising from decreasing returns to scale are taxed away
(Auerbach, 1985). In accordance wi[h the law of Walras, the government budget constraint follows from
the household buget constraint and (3), i.e. [bNL-GfAtNS. Labour tax revenues thus fmance pubGc
spending, which consists o( pubGc consumption, abatemeot and lump-sum subsidies.3
I.2. The margina! cost ojpublic junds and the second~est outcome
The government can freely choox the level of pubGc goods (G), pub6c abatement (A) and the
tax rate (t), but is unable to employ lump-sum taxes or subsidies (S-0).t Thus, the tax ra[e xrves the
dual purpox of, on the one óand, internalirietg endtrottmental auernalities and, oo the other hand,
fmancing pubGc spending. This gives rix to second-best problems. The government thus xleds G, A and
t to maximize social welfare (W), i.e.
W- N U- N m((1-t)b,Oj t N R(G) t N E(e(A) - aNb![(1-Qb,Oj), (4)
subject [o tbN![(1-t)b,Oj-G tA. This vields (or pubGc consumption and abatemenh
N R' (G) - N E' (e(A) - al'j e' (A) - ~t (~
whece ~ is the marginaJ disutility o( raising a unit of government revenues. Clearly, each pound of public
spending must yield the same marginal utility, 'vrespective of whether it is uxd for pubGc consumption
or abatemen[. Rewri[ing the Cirst par[ of (5) gives:
~" (G)~M~ - v ~ w~a. (6)
Hence, the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption should
equal the marginal cost of pubGc funds (q) which can diverge from the marginal rate of transforma[ioo
between pubGc and private goods (i.e. uniry). Scarcer public funds (and thus a higher q) causes
substitution away from pubGc [owards private consumption. The xcond part of (5) wn be wri[ten as
e" (A) - a~t~, tti i(NaE' ~McO) - aE" ~R" (7)
where t` is the non-distortionary leve! of the tax ra[e. Becaux e"~0, the op[imal level of pubGc
abatement increases with the implicit price of the emironment (i.e. t`~a which is the non-distortiooary
level of the tax rate scaled by the emission-output ratio). Equation (7) also reveals that the margiaal rate
ot substitution between environmental quality and public goods (E' ~R' ) must equal the implicit price of
the environment. 1( the marginal cost o( public funds is unity (i.e. if lump-sum taxes and subsidies are
available), the oon-distortionary level of the tax rate corresponds exactly to the textbook Pigovian tax
rate, i.e. the sum o( the marginal enJtronmental damages (NaE' scaled by M~ to convert from utility
t If the government can adopt lump-sum subsidies and [axes, there is no ezcess burden of distor-
tionary taxation and thc marginal cost of public funds equals the marginal rate of transformation between
pubGc and private goods (unity). The resulting outcome is fus[ best in the xnse that the command
outcome can be repGwted by appropriate government policy in a competitive market economy.4
units into pounds). The non-distortionary kvel of the tax rate (tN) deaeases with the marginal cost of
pubGc funds (q). The reason is the followiug. The optimal environmental tax equates the social costs of
pollution to the social benefits associated witó the additional tax revenue wlleaed on pollution. If a high
marginal cost of public funds indicates that tax revenue is scarce, pollu[ion dces not óave to yield az
much tax revenue to offset the environmental damage. Accordingly, the pollution tax rate falls with the
marginal cost of pub6c funds. Altematively, a high marginal cost of pubGc funds indicates that public
goods, including the natural environment, are expensive so that the government can afford less to
internalize enJvonmental externalities.
The government also sets the tax rate to matámize social welfare (4) which yields:
- Nbtt~,, t NE' abtJbl, t w bN (L-tbl~,) - 0.
Use of Roy's identity, subs[itution of (7) for ty, and then division by -bNLa yields:
o ~ wla - (1-t)I[1-t-(t-t;~)Et~ - (1-ql[1-t-(oM-1)v(t-t,;)l.
(g)
(g' )
If the labour supply curve slopes upwards (c~~0, oM~l) and [he [ax rate exceeds its noo-dis[ortionary
level (vty), the marginal cost of pubGc funds (q) exceeds the marginal rate of transformation between
public and private goods (i.e. unity). An increase in public revenues then exacerba[es the deadweigh[ loss
of dis[ortiooary taxatioo and raises [he marginal cost of public (unds above unity. However, it U[~; and
the labour supply curve bends backwards (e~~Q o,a~l), the marginal cost of pubGc funds is less than
unity. If labour supply is inelas[ic (c~-0, oN-1), the marginal cost of pubGc funds corresponds to the
marginal rate of vansforma[ion between public and private consumption (i.e. uni[y). In that case, a
labour tax acts like a lump-sum tax and the second-best outcome coincides with the first-best outcome.
11. Comparative statics of the second-best outcome
11.1. Prtva(e behaviour and'marrcet equilibrium
We loglinearize the equations for private behaviour, market equilibrium and optimal government
policy around a benchmark with 5-0. Logarithmic deviations from the benchmark are denoted by a[ilde
(e.g. b3db~b), unless indicated otherwise. Equation (2) yields:
L - EL (b-i), V - -E~ (L~V) (b-U, C - (lt ft~ (b-t), M - L (b-t) (2' )
where eL-(oN 1)V and tedt~(I-t). A higher tax rate reduces prívate utility (M). We use (2' ) to
loglinearize (3), or equicalently the government budget constraint
"c G' rvA A- b t L-"c C- b t Í~c-EL(1-~c~l (t-b) - b t(1-t-Eyt) (t-b) (3' )5
where ~~~NC~Y-1-t, rvG~G~Y and ~,A~A~Y denote the national income shares of private consump-
tioq pubGc consumptioo and abatement, respectively. The lek-hand side of (3' ) stands for total pubGc
spending, which must equal pubGc revenues. The fust term in the bracJcet of the lazt right-hand side (1-
t-~,~) corresponds to the 'tax rate' e(fea. The second term in this bracket (-c~t) stands for the "tax
base" effect. If the labour supply curve slopes upwards (bends badtwards), i.e. oM is greater (less) than
unity, a higher tax rate narrows (broadens) the tax base and tax revenues thus rise less (more) than
proportionally with the tax rate. We rule out a dowvward-slopirtg Lafïer-curve (i.e. 0~1-t-(oy,t-1)Vt~O or
c~c(1-I)~[).
Substituting (3' ) into (2' ) to eliminate [, we obtain for the chartge in private utilitv
IN - L!;t(b -~G G- rvA ,4), where Os(1-t)-e~t~0. (9)
lience, private utility suffers from higher pubGc consumptioo or abatement (on account of the higher tax
rate required to fmance these activities) but benefits from higlter productivity.
I1.2. Gavemmenr policy and the marginal cost ofpuólic funds
We assume that private utiGty, public consumption and endvonmental quality are perfect
substitutes, i.e. R(G)-yGG and E(e(A)-aY]-yE(e(A)-aY]. The changes in pubGc abatement and the
non-distortionary level of the tax rate thea (ollow from (~:
A - (tN-a)~oA - (7E-7G)wq and 7E - 7G (7' )
where oA~-Ae"~e' ~0 is the elasticity of the effectiveness of pubGc abatement. More em~ronmental
concern (ryE~O) or less priority for pubfic consumption (7GC0) raises the non-distortionary level of the
tax rate. This pushes up the shadow price of the environment (ty~a) which in turn induces the
government to undertake more abatement. A higher emission-ou[put ratio (a) raises the non-dis[ortion-
ary level of the tax rate, but does no[ affect public abatement.
Loglineari7ing the condi[ion for optimal publíc coosumption (6) while using M~-(V-C)V~oN
and (2' ), we obtain the modified Samuelson rule:
7G - V(t-b) - 7G t(V~L-) M- q. (6' )
The change in the marginal tost of public funds follows from (8' ):
n- c~.~(1-t)-t [(Rtt-t,;) i- tti t~' (t-[v)Et.(LIv) b1
- E~n(1-t)-t ((i-t~) b- t~ iN -(R't-tv)~-t M16
where R~1-tt(t-t~)(oM-1)L. We assume that R~O.~ If the labour supply curve slopes upwards (oM~l),
a higher tax rate raises the marginal cost of pubhc funds and thus makes pubhc consumption and
abatement more expensive (as we assume that Rit-t,y~0). Inaeases in envuonmental concern (ryE~O)
or the emission-output ratio (à~0) boost the non-distortionary level of the tax rate (see (T )). The higher
non-distortionary tax ra[e reduces the marginal cost o[ pubGc funds if the labour supply curve slopes
upwards. This induces substitution away from private utility towards pubGc goods, including abatemen[
(see (6' )). If, in contrazt, the labour supply curve bends backwards (oMCl), greener prefereoces or a
higher emission-output ratio raise the marginal cost of pubGc funds as distortioaary taxes are replaced by
non-distortionary pollution taxes (see (8' )).




r~ Ka JI ~(1-tr.t)V b- tt,tV (ify~ t(1-LifLOM(t-tr,~)) Í'O]
M
t - K (aaMl) (a}Y~ ; (KVOM) Ya }
~I-~1tt~~~apM1~~ D
where [he ccefficient of b in (11) can be shown to be positive if v[~3.
IL3. Pn~are utiliry, public consumption and emàronmenml qualiry
When we use (10) in (6' ), we obtain for private utility:
M- f(oM-1)Ll [(1-tr,) 6- tN (aty~J -( AL I Y It KOM J I KQMVJ O.
(10)
(12)
Clearly, L-(cL~L)M and C-(lt e JL-tM follow directly from (12). As long as the labour supply curve is
not completely inelastic, L is a negative fuuction of àt7E and a positive funetion of b, irrespective of
whether aH exceeds or is less [han one. The change in public consumption (G) follows residually by
substituting (7' ) and (12) into (9):
- fo~(aM-1)1 -(~Al j e2 rvAl ( n(1-t„)(aM-1)1
~oG l xo J(aaY~ l o JYe } lKa V} o JYo ` ll - Ko 6. (13)
M A M A M
With the aid of (2' ), (3) and (7) we obtain for environmeotal quality (E~-e(A)-aY):
E. --(Iti~aE) [a t b t cL (~t)) t (~n~aE~ A (14)
'- If t ~ ty, then t c~ is suf6cient for R~ 0. [f t c tn, then t~(o,~-1)c 1 is sufficient for K ~0.
3 This ecefficient is equal to [~t t~,.V(oM-1) f(t-t,~)L(oN-1)Z]~aoM.where aE~([t,;~a)E~~Y denotes the social value of env'uortmental quality relative to national inwme.
Environmental quality improves J pubGc abatement rises or tho emission-output ratio (a) falLs. A higher
tax rate improves (worsens) environmental quality J the labour supply curve slopes upwards (backwards).
A higher productivity of labour (b) worsens the quality of the enduonment (as 1tc~-LtVo,~~O).
Substi[uting (7' ) and (11) into (14), we obtain:
KO~ KQK ~e ~. - - ~~1 -l~v(Q4-1)ZIJ i - ~~1 i1(1-~v(OM-1)2IJ 6
OA KO~ YB OA KOy YO. ; l~Ai`tNV(QM-1~11 ; l~A-~~e(QM-i)IJ
( l4')
11.4. More concem abour the envimnrnent
Greener preferences (ryE~O) raises both [he nooáistortionary level of the tax rate and public
abatement (see (7' )). 1( the labour supply curve slopes upwards (oN ~ 1), the larger oon-distortionary
level of the tax rate depresses the marginal cost of pubGc fuads and makes public spending cheaper. The
associated highcr tax rate decreases private utility bu[ increases aggregate public spending (i.e. pubGc
consump[ion plus abatement). If the elas[icity of effectiveness of pubGc aba[emeot (oA) is small, pubGc
abatement rises substantially. Hcncc, despite the rise in the tax rate and overall pubGc spending, public
consump[ion (being residually determined) may fall. The higher tax burden changes the composition of
private demand away from private consumption goods towards leisure (V~ C). As o,~t ~ 1, this substitution
effect outweighs the decGne in demand for Icisure on account of the negative income effect associated
with the higher tax level. Hence, greener preferences reduce employment so that enJvonmental quality is
improved through a lower level of economic activity and emissions as well as through more pubGc
abatement (i.e. a cleaner composition of activity).
However, if the labotu supply curve bends backwards (o,~~l), more concern for the environ-
ment raises the marginal cost of public funds. ln this case, the óigher oon-distortionary level of the tax
rate raises the marginal cost of pubGc funds (see (S' )) and makes public spending more expensive.
Hence, the tax rate and the level of public spending fall while priva[e consumption rises. The lower [ax
burden induces households to shift away from leisure towards consumption goods (C~V). In this case,
the increase in leisure demand due to [he positive income efTect associated with a lower tax level offsets
the substitution effect away from leisure (az oNU). Employment, activity and emissions thus falJ. Tbe
lower overall level of pubfic spending together with the rise in pubGc abatement (see (7' )) imply that
pubGc consumption must fall. Public consumption is thus crowded out by both more abatement (i.e.
deaner composition of public spending) and by a lower tax rate and level of public spending.
Proposition 1: Greener preJerences reduce emplov~rtent. output and emissions, unless labour supply is
completely inelastic. Envimnmentat qualiry impmves also due to mon public abatement. If the labour
supph~ curve slopes upwards (downwards), the marginal cost ojpublic funds and the private component oj8
utiiiry fa!! (rise) while rhe tar rate and public spending rise (fall). Public consumption rises only if a largr
elasticiry of the effectiveness of puólic aóatemen! contains the rise in public abatemenr and at the same time
an upward-sloping labour supply cun~e raises the aggregate level of pubiic spending.
Greeo and red preferences are thus incompatible, in the sense that environmental quality and
public consumption do not move together, J there is a lot of scope for pubGc abatement or i[ labour
supply bends backwards. However, J the elasticity of [he effediveness of pubGc abatement and the
(uncompensated) labour supply elasticity are large and positive, pubGc con.sumption inaeases so that
green and red preferences are compatible. In that case, pub6e abatement dces not rise much while
employmeot falls substantially. Hence, most of the improvement in enJvonmental quality is achieved
through a lower level rather than a cleaner composition of economic auivity.
A higher emission-ou[put ratio (a) induces [he same effects on the marginal cost of public funds,
the tax rate, private utility and employment as dces an inuease in environmental concern (y~, but dces
not afteu pubGc abatement. If labour supply slopes upwards (downwards), the marginaJ cost of pubGc
funds falls (rises) so pubGc consumption rises (falls) while private utility decreases (increases). The
deterioration of [he environmen[ induced by the higher emissionoutput ratio is reduced by the fall in
output. In fact, a rise in the emissioa-output ratio may improve environmeotal quality J oy is very small
(see (14' )).
II.S. More prionryfor public consumption
A greater desire for pubGc consumption (y~~0) lowers both the non-distortionary level of Ihe
tax rate and pubGc abatement (see (7')) as Ihe government can afford less to use taxes to internalize
environmental extcrnalities. The tax rate rises and the private component of utility falls in order to make
room for pubhc consumption. If the labour supply slopes upwards (bends backwards), the marginal cost
of pubGc funds rises ((alls) and employment falls (rises). Overall public spending expands while the
composition changes away from abatemen[ towards public consumption. Environmental quality worsens
due to (all in pubGc abatement and, if labour supply bends backwards, the increase in output and thus
emissions. However, if the elasticity of labour supply is large and positive and the elasticity of the
ef(ectiveness of public abatement (oA) is large, the environmen[ improves because the beneficial e((ect of
the fall in output and emissions outweighs the adverse e(ïeu of less abatement. While economic activity
contraus a lot due to the disincentive effects of a higher tax burden (as oyt is large), the composition of
activity dces not become much dir[ier (as oA is large). Environmental quality and pubGc consumption
thus move together (i.e. green and red preferences are compatible) if the level of activity is reduced
while the composilion of activity is not affeued much.
Proposition 2: More concem about public consumption increases the taz rate and decreases privote utiliry
and public abatement. If the labour supply curve slopes upwards (downwards), employment and emissíons9
fall (rise). Unless substitution efjecu in lobow supply ryr strong and the elasticiry oj the effectiveness oj
public abatemen[ is lorg~e (i.e., both oM and oq orc latge), environmentel damoges increase so that red ond
green preferences am incompatible.
11.6. Increase in labourproductiviry
A higher labour productivity (b) boosts employmen[ (unlest, of course, labour supply is
completely inelastic). Since pubGc abatement is unaffeaed, enJvonmental quality suffers. If the labour
supply curve slopes upwards (downwards), the marginal cost of pubGc funds and private utility rise (fall).
Public consumption rises due to the higher tax ra[e.
1[I. IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTION BETR~EN PRIVATE UTILITY AND PUBLIC GOODS
To allow for imperfect substitution between the private component of utility and pubGc
consumption, consider the following social welfare function:
W ~ N Q[M(C,V),GJ t N 7E[e(A) - aY] (a' )
where Q[.J is concave and weakly homothe[ic. We use Ihe specification Q[M,GJ-[M~t7GGLJtl~ wi[h
j~l and oQ-(1-f)'t~0 is the elasticity of substitution between M and G in Q[.J. This CES-specificatioo
reduces [o the case studied in section ll if oQ tends to infmity. The separabiGty of private consumption
and leisure on [he one hand and pub6c consumption oo the other óand, impGes tha[ priva[e behaviour
(2) and óeoce (2' ) are unaf(ected.
The optimality condition for the provision of public consumption becomes:
NQ~~QHM~ - n aWla.
For pubGc abatement and the non-distortiooary level of the tax rate, we obtain:
e~ (A)-a~t~, t~ z (NaYE~QuM~~o - a7E~Qc.
Expression (8' )(or the marginal cost of pubGc funds is unaffected.
111.1. The MCPF-schedule and the GBC-schedule
(6„)
Loglineaziting the moditied Samuelson rule (6"), we obtain:
G- M - oQ [y~ t(V~L) Ivt - n] (15)
where oQ stands for the elasticity of substitution betweeo G and M. A higher priori[y for public10
consumption (y~), a higher real consumptioo wage (or higher M), and a lower marginal cost of public
funds (p) induce a shift away from the private compooeat of utiliry to pubGc consumptioq particularly i(
pubGc consumption and private utility are good substitutes.
L,oglinearizing (7"), we obtain:
A-(i~;-à)~oA, tN - á t 7E -[1 taG(op-1) tl 7~ -(1-acbQ t(M-G) (16)
where aG:GQc~Q-ycfyet(M~Q)~]-'. subuimuon ~om pubGc consumption towards private utiGty
(i.e., M~G) raises the marginal utility of pubhc consumption. This reduces the nondistortionary level o(
the tax rate as this part of the tax is deCmed in terms of pubGc reveoue. PubGc abatement falls in
response to [he lower noo-distortionary level of the tax rate.
Substituting ( 16) into (g") and [heo into (15), we ob[ain:




A higher level of private utility (M) raises public consumption through two channels. The Cirst channel,
represented by the lazt term in square brackets in (12' ), is a reduction in the marginal cost of pubGc
funds. This is due to the substitution away from leisure az a resul[ of higher private utitity (i.e., V~C i(
M~O, see (2')). The second channel involves imperfeU substitution between private utiliry and public
consumption. If private utility and public consumption are poor substitutes, the two components of social
utility move together.
The MCPF-schedule (12' ) shJts upwards when the weight given to public consumption (y~)
increases (see Figure 1). If the labour supply curve slopes upwards (downwards), the MCPF-schedule
shifts upwards (downwards) in response to an increaze in eovironmental concem (y~, an increase in the
emissioo-output ratio (a) or a fall in labour productivity (b). If private utility and pubGc consumption are
perfect substitutes, the MCPF-locus is vertical (cf. (12)1 If private utility and public consumption are
perfect complements (0~-0), in contrast, Ihe MCPF-schedule corresponds to [he 45a-line going Ihrough
the origin and is unaf(ected by changes in environmental concern, the emission-output ratio or labour
produc[ivity.
The government budget constraint may with the aid of (9) and (16) be loglinearized as:
tvA 1-4~ Gj - b- oA ~Ye-~1'ao(aQ-1)-t~Yo~ -~L
l~aloa~~MJ l~a4l ( A A Q aAaQ
T t. (17)
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If pubhc consump[ion and private utility are fairly close substitutes (large oQ), there is a negative
relationship between the changes in pubhc consumption and private utiliry which arises from the positive
relationship between G and the change in the tax rate. If the priority attached to envvonmental qualityI1
rises relative to pubhc consumption, public abatement inaeases. Heoce, given private utiGty, less finance
is available for public consumption and the GBC-schedule (1~ thus shifts downwards (see Figures 1(a)
and 1(b)).
if public consumption and private utility are nat close substitutes (small 00) and the elasticity of
the effectiveness of public abatement (oq) is small, the GBC-locus may aaually slope upwards (az in
Figures 1(c) and 1(d)). Intuitively, an inaease in private utility requires a similar inaease in pubGc
consumption if it is difficult to substitu[e between [hc [wo components of social u[ility. A higher level of
private utility then crowds out pubfic abatement rather than pubfic coosumption. In particular, if priva[e
utility and pubGc consumption are imperfed substitutes, higher private utility raises the marginal social
utility of public consumption (Q~). This reduces the Pigovian taz component (see (7")) and, J the
elasticity oq is small, substantially decreases public abatement. If the fall in pubGc abatemen[ is large
enough, public consumptioo wn rise despite the decline in overall pubGc spending.
111.2. Compamtive sratres of the second~est oulcome
Figures 1(a) and I(b) present the case of easy substitution between private utility and pubGc
consumption (large oQ) or a large elasticity of the ef(ectiveness of abatement (oq), i.e. a downward-
sloping GBC-schedWe. Figure 1(a) assumes an upward-sloping and Figure 1(b) a downward-sloping
labour supply curve. The benchmark is E while E' and E" are the equilibria after an inaease in the
emission-outpu[ ratio (a) and in eovironmental concero (7~, respectively. Figure 1(a) confums
propositions 1 and 2. An increase in the emission-output ratio decreases [he private component o( utility
and employment and increases public consump[ion. Greeoer preferences yield similar effects, except that
pubGc consumptioo may (all if a small oq causes pubGc abatemeot to rise a lot (shifting the GBC-
schedule substantially downward)4.
Figure 1(b) (with large oQ and oq bu[ with oN~l) reveals that a higher emission-output ratio
raises private ulility bu[ reduces public consumption and employment, thus confirming propositions I and
2. However, Figure 1(b) also illustrates the possibi6ty of a counter-example to propositions 1 and 2 in
case of a green shock. If the labour supply curve bends backwards (oN~l) and the elasticity of the
ef(ectiveness o( public aba[ement (oq) is small, the GBC-schedWe shifts downward quite a bt. An
increase in environmental concern (7~ may then reduce private utili[y~ (as well as public consumption).
The associated adverse income effect reduces the demand for leisure, thereby raising employment.
Accordingly, for this special case we contirm the 'double di~idend' hypothesis, i.e. greener preferences
not only enhance environmental quality but also boost employment.
Figures 1(c) and 1(d) present the case where substitution between pubhc consumption and
private utility is difficult (low o~) and the elasticity of the effectiveness of pubfic abatement (oq) is small
a oQ needs to be large.
5 This can only happen if the MCPF-schedule is not vertical, i.e. oQ cannot be infinite.12
so that the GBC-schedule slopes upwards. If also the labour supply curve slopes upwards, then Figure
1(c) reveak that private utility, pubGc consumption and employment fall. Intuitively, a grccn shock must
reduce at least one of the other two parts of social utility (i.e., private utility M or pubGc consumption
G). If substitution between M and G is difficult, M and G move in the same d'uection and thus botó
decGne. Thc lower level of private utility as.cociated with the higher tax ratc reduces the demand (or
leisure as the substitution effect exceeds the income etfect (as oM ~ 1).
If the labour supply curve bends backwards (cL~O), Figure 1(d) reveals tha[ a higher emission-
output ratio raises pubGc consumption and private utility but reduces employment. However, an increase
in environmental concern may reduce private utility, especially if a small elasticity o( the effeUiveness of
public abatement causes a substantial dowvward shift of the GBC-schedule. The fall in private utility
raises employment, since the adverse income efTeu more than offsets the substitution etfect (oN~l),
thereby reducing the demand for leisure. This provides another counter-example to propositions 1 and 2.
Thesc diagrammatic results are confirmed by analytically solving (12' ) and (1~. For example,
the unpact on private u[ility of more eovironmental concern may be written as:
M - - L





The effects on the tax ra[e, the marginal cost of pubGc funds and employment follow from Í--M~L,
~-VM~L and L-eLM~L, respectively. I( oQ approaches infinity, (18) boils down to ( 12). If oQ-O and
oA is fmite, an increase in emironmental concern (7E) reduces the marginal cos[ o( public funds, thereby
raising Ihe [ax rate and thus reducing private u[iGty (see ( 18)). Governmen[ consumptioo declines (as
G-1N J oQ-O). Employmeal falls (rises) if labour supply slopes upwards (downwards). Overall public
spending and thus abatement increase.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A more ambitious en~ironmental poGcy raises the non-distortionary level of the tax rate and
boosts public abatement. In general, this depresses labour supply and economic activity. If substitution
effects dominate income effects in labour supply, a greener pohcy raises the tax rate and reduces the
marginal cost of pubhc funds which makes more room for public spending. [n this case, public
consumption may rise if most of the improvement. in environmental quality is achieved through lower
production rather than more aba[emen[. However, if the eovironmeot improves mainly due to pubGc
abatement and employment dces not fall too much, public consumption falls.
In general, a higher priority to envirottmental policy reduces employment because consumption13
of leisure is cleanó while productioo po0utes the environment. However, if private u[ility and pubGc
consumptioo are poor substitutes, the elasticity of the effeUiveoeu of pubGc abatement is small and the
labour supply curve bends backwards, an inaease in enviroruaental concero may aaually raise employ-
ment. The improvement in the quality of the enJvoamen[ is then achieved through an expansion of
public abatement ra[her than through an inaease in the consumplion of leisure and a reduction in
emissions. The increase in public abatement is fuianced by an inaease in Ihe tax rate, a broadening of
the tax base, and a cut in pubGc coosumption. While the Jn~e! of economic activity increases, the
composition of that activity becomes more friendly to the endvonment. This is a channel through which
the "double dividend" hypothesis can be given some support.
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